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1.
Many people believe, perhaps correctly, that the learned man of the 
middle ages was skilled in all sciences. In our days the concept of the lear­
ned man is certainly understood in a different way. Whereas human know­
ledge of the world in the middle ages would probably have not filled more 
than a few volumes, at present, writings on a single branch of science fill 
libraries. The consequence of the cumulation of knowledge is specializa­
tion, which entails a further consequence, i.e. the lack of knowledge in 
provinces beyond the limits one's own special field of expertise. The lear­
ned man posseses at most some general knowledge of the various branches 
of science and trade, and it is only his own speciality where deep knowledge 
may reasonably expected of him. Of course, all what is written in the previo­
us sentence is only a relative truth since even in our times there are people 
who possess deep and detailed knowledge belonging to various branches of 
science, sometimes quite distant from each other. However, such exceptio­
nal phenomena do not change the general rule and most (one may say 
avarage) human beings are experts only wit hin the boundaries of their own 
trade or profession and are dilettants in other fileds at the very best.
In the administration of justice the members of the investigating 
authority, prosecutors and the court, frequently need skills and knowledge 
belonging to the realm of other than their own speciality so that they can 
establish and evaluate facts. This need is the consequence of the great 
variety of matters demanding the attention of the law. In addition to cases 
where the establishment and the evaluation of the facts do not require 
more than general experience and the sufficient knowledge of law, there 
are others (and in a high number) where neither the discovery nor the 
evaluation of certain facts is possible without the use of special expertise 
going well beyond the limits of law. The external assistance, needed to per­
form these tasks, is provided by experts.
* This paper is a part of the author's dissertation entitled Expert Opinion in Criminal 
Procedure.
The employment of experts is not a- new development in the adminis­
tration of justice. The expert was a figure known to the legal systems of 
antiquity and the development of the institution of the expert can be follo­
wed in mediaeval law, tood Hut. due to scientific progress and the deve­
lopment of technology, the administration of justice of modern times is 
simply inconcievable without judicial experts. The role and the legal posi­
tion of the expert has always been much discussed in legal writings, which 
shows clearly the importance of his activity in the administration of jus­
tice.
As far as the legal position of the expert is concerned, the opinions 
expressed by various scholars in different times are far from being uni­
form. Some authors had the view that the expert was an assistant of the 
judge, others regarded him as a special type of witness, others again beli­
eved him to be a judge of scientific matters. All these and other views ap- 
pearted. then disapeared just to reappear again, in the theory of) aw and 
it is a sign that they, although never perfect definitions, expressed one or 
another characterist ic feature of this special procedural figured
Since the legal position of the expert and the evidentiary role of his 
opinion are impossible to analyse separately, scholars have always paid 
serious attention also to the latter. The opinions, naturally, are different 
again. Some authors say that the expert's opinion must not be regarded 
as evidenced Clearly, these scholars believe the expert to be the assistant 
of the court or judge of facts or scientific matters. Others, considering the 
expert a participant of the evidentiary process, try to find ways of applying 
the basic concepts of evidence to the expert opinion. They try to find the 
answer to the question whether the expert's report is a piece of evidence or 
a means of evidence; or whether the expert's report has special charac­
teristics rendering the facts stated in it more significant than other types 
of evidence, or not. AH these view s are well known and for the lack of space 
1 am not going to describe them in detail, neither do I intend to do more 
than to state my own position in connection with that issue.
In my opinion the caper/ :.s a pa;7;c;puM/ o/* /Ac crá/eu/ány process, dif­
fering írom others as far as it is through using his professional knowledge 
and skills that he participates in the establishment or evaluation of facts. 
The result oi his activities is the repor/, ?cA;'rA cor ctá/cu/ány wuv/M.y, and 
the /hr/.s .s/a/ed m ¿7 /ora;. e; á/c;;ce.
If it is accepted that the activity of the expert belongs to the realm of 
the evidentiary process and his report is a means or source of evidence, it is 
clearly from the point of view of evidence that the analyses should be done. 
It seems to me any other positon would be quite difficult to maintain even 
if the peculiar features of the role of the expert in the professional evalua­
tion of the facts were perhaps even more difficult to deny. In criminal pro­
cedure it is only such an attitude that makes possible to allow the parties 
to check and dispute the correctness of the expert's report, contributing 
by that to the right establishment of the facts. If the activity of the expert 
is not part of the evidentiary process the parties cannot make any comment 
concerning his report, they may not dispute its correctness and credibility,
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and the tack of such right is incompatible with the idea of contradictoria! 
procedure.
In common taw systems it cannot be doubted that the expert is a 
participant of the evidentiary process, since he is a witness of a party, dis­
tinguished from other witnesses by being entitled to testify his opinion. 
In practice, precisely this is expected of him.
The tegai position of the expert is more problematic in procedural 
systems where his participation in the procedure is iniatiated by a decision 
of the proceeding authorities. However, the fact that the expert is appoin­
ted by the proceeding authority does not elevate him to the rank of the 
authorities and does not put him above the other participants of the eviden- 
tiarv process. Another point to be mentioned here is that as it is not in- 
concievable in common law systems that the court should appoint an ex­
pert, in the same way, it is possible in other systems that the appointment 
of the expert should be initiated by the parties or the parties should obtain 
expert evidence themselves. In a sense, this is a technicality, having small 
effect on the essence of the matter.
In the above parts expertise has already been mentioned and I have 
made reference to the "opinion" of the expert which may appear in his 
report. However, the expert's conclusions are determined, in addition to 
his professional knowledge, by the matter examined by him — in most 
cases without some materia! to be examined the experts has nothing to 
form an opinion about. Naturally, it happens that the expert does not have 
to examine any thing and his task is merely to report or to explain certain 
scientific or professionally established and accepted facts, principles or 
knowledge. In such cases, however, there is no opinion, since the expert 
reports on matters of knowledge and not on that of opinion.
On the basis of all this, the soMrcas of Me ecñfeace provided Me eai- 
peH are Me Miovdedye and .sMd of Me carped, t'.e. /Ms eaiperM.se, Me ina/erád 
earamfned M/ /¡ña and /Ms rcasonMy. (I do not mention the process of the 
examination of materials separately since it is an indisposable part of 
learning the characteristic traits of the material and. in this way, cannot 
be separated of that.)
In this paper some issues related to the concept and scope of expertise 
will be discussed.
II.
The necessity of expertise is generally recognised as a natural pre­
condition of participation as an expert in the evidentiary process. However, 
as far as the concept of expertise is concerned, there is more difference than 
agreement among the views of the scholars. The debates in the literature 
have always been interesting, but from the practical point of view they 
have not been very productive. For example. Hungarian empirical studies 
show that the practice did not make too much use of the scholarly views.*
The concept of expertise is rather important in criminal procedure, 
since it depends on its interpretation what is considered a problem the so-
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[útion of which requires an expert. The authorities proceeding in criminal 
cases, disregarding the opinions experessed in legal writings, frequently 
employ experts when no special expertise is needed to establish or evaluate 
certain facts.
In the various legal systems the basis of appointing an expert is the 
need for expertise. The Hungarian Code of Criminal procedure mentions 
special expertise, the Polish Code speaks of special knowledge, the law on 
evidence in California names special knowledge, skill, experience, training 
or education as the qualifications of an expert. The examples, although 
random, reflect the essence of the matter. I t seems that the key term is spe­
cial expertise, but to understand its meaning one has to see what is the 
standard to which special expertise is compared.
For a starting point I take the fact that any kind of professional know­
ledge includes certain elements known in a broader circle of people than 
those who are specialists in the particular field. The province of the neces­
sary knowledge of a profession or a trade includes parts belonging also to 
the realm of other fields and sometimes these elements cannot be conside­
red as professional knowledge in the strict sense of the word. Skill in ele­
mentary arithmetics may be mentioned here, as an example and actually 
it is more a matter of everyday knowledge than professional expertise. 
When the establishment or evaluation of facts requires such type of know­
ledge. it is superfluous to employ and expert.
The province of knowledge of all professions includes, of course, cer­
tain elements important also to other fields and not only to the one in 
question, but not belonging to the realm of everyday common knowledge. 
The fact that the intensity of light decreases in proportion with the sqaure 
of the distance from its source is well known for example by photographers 
or biologists working with microscopes or by engineers designing optical 
instruments and it cannot be considered commonly known, even if it is not 
a scientific fact known only by specialists.
Finally, there is a type of knowledge, which belongs clearly to the do­
main of professional knowledge, due, simply, to the fact that only the 
specialists of a particular field need it. For example, the knowledge of 
the most expedient technique of appendoctomy is not particularly needed 
by anyone outside the medical profession.
It is only natural that the dividing line between various professional 
fields are far from being rigid and the province of knowledge of any parti­
cular field keeps extending. For this reason one would find to difficult to 
name any element of professional knowledge that is necessarily known by 
only the members of single profession but unknown in all other fields. It 
can be added that knowledge belonging to the province of a certain pro­
fession is open also for the lay and the non-professional also may have cer­
tain expertise in a field.
Thus, professional knowledge, expertise, is relative from the point of 
view its depth and comprehensiveness and, in terms of expertise, there may 
be significant differences among the professionals of the same field.
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Another important, perhaps fundamenta! factor of relativity is the 
fieid from the aspects of which expertise is examined. For those who pur­
sue the same profession, the possession of the knowledge of the particular 
fieid is not special expertise but a natura! requirement. For the members of 
the same profession, special expertise is having a knowledge not posessed 
by fellow professionals in general. One might perhaps say that a butcher 
or a baker would regard the skill needed by a candlestick maker as special 
expertise and a mathematician writing computer programs probably lacks 
the knowledge necessary to repair the broken down machine because it is 
special knowledge from his point of view. And perhaps it is justified to 
take an example somewhat closer to my own topic: Could it be denied that 
the expertise of the trained lawyer is special knowledge from the point of 
view of the medical expert participating in a criminal case?
The viewpoint, it seems, is a strong factor in determining the special 
nature of expertise. And, since fa crmn'na? procedwre it is the viewpoint of 
the proceeding authority that is decisive and the expertise of such authori­
ties embraces primarily the know ledge of law. apecád Araoa-
Mye /uHwy protu'nce o/ 7w.
The use of expertise belonging to someone else's profession is evaluated 
in the factifinding process of criminal procedure in a way different from 
other fields. While expertise in other fields can be directly used in one's own 
profession in many spheres of activity, the law of criminal procedure does 
not allow the members of the proceeding authorities to make direct use of 
their expertise in other fields than law in the evidentiary process. Naturally, 
to be an expert in any profession, in addition to law, is not prohibited for a 
member of the proceeding authority either. On the contrary, such knowled­
ge is clearly useful, but it may not be used to prove relevant facts.
The reasons of that attitude are closely related to the very nature of 
the procedure and it would be hard to deny their justification. Apart from 
anything else, I refer only to the principles of the contradictoria! procedure: 
if facts established by the proceeding authorities, particularly by the court, 
through the direct use of their non-legal expertise, were taken into account 
by them as evidence, the principles of contradictoria! procedure would be 
violated.s
The special expertise of the members of the proceeding authorities, 
consequently, may not substitute for the expert's report but ittm ay 
have its use in the process of evaluating the expert evidence. This is a con­
sequence of the principles of the evidentiary process. As the members of the 
authorities may not use their private knowledge of the relevant facts (if a 
person was a w itness to an event relevant in a case, he may not be a judge 
at the same time, for example), the same way they may not use their special 
skills instead obtaining expert evidence. If it were allowed, the interests of 
the parties would suffer: they have the right to dispute the significance of a 
piece of evidence or the reliability of a witness or the correctness of an ex­
pert's report, but they hardly could do that (or successfully do that) when 
the authority forms the expert opinion itself.
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HI.
In the doctrines of law there are some general rules related to the pro­
vince of knowledge of the proceeding authorities.
FúótJy.- The authority knows the law and the member of the authority 
may, actually is obliged, to make use of his knowledge.
Secondly.- Knowledge belonging outside the law may be used by the 
members of the authority only to the extent and in the way as it is accepted 
by the law. The facts that are relevant tor the case have to be proved un­
less there are legal exceptions to the rule : knowledge, if not possessed by 
everyone, nocessary, however, for deciding the case, has to be introduced 
through evidence even if the member of the authority posseses it.
Evidentiary rules in criminal procedure, while rational from certain 
special point of view, are not always rational in terms of economy. It would 
be difficult to say that limiting the use of the private special expertise of 
of members of the authority renders the evidentiary process economical. 
Still, rationality is present: if it is admitted that the contradictoria) proce­
dure is the right way to discover the truth (and it is generally admitted) then 
the rationality of the guarantees required in a contradictoria! procedure 
must also be admitted. And it would hardly be easy to eliminate the rules 
excluding private knowledge as evidence from the rules having the nature 
of guarantee.
However, it is rationality again that requires the acceptance of rules 
which allow that certain facts could be established without evidence, or 
certain non-legal knowledge could be used. Facts that do not have to be 
proved are, among others, accepted scientific principles, the matter of 
common knowledge and self-evident facts. (The issue is discussed by Tibor 
Aurdb/ in detail.)6
In Hungarian legal writings the concept of special expertise is discussed 
mostly in connection with its lower limit. Some authors believe that the 
lower limit of special expertise is the general educational level of the citi­
zens, others are of the opinion that it is the general professional expertise 
of the members of the proceeding authorities. Without describing the diffe­
rent arguments, I have only a few remarks on the issue.
József Códony has pointed out that the concept of special expertise 
has changing contents. As a consequence of scientific and technological 
progress, new and new discoveries are added to the province of knowledge 
of the various professions while other elements cease to be part of special 
professional expertise and become common knowledge.? One has to agree 
with him and may say that the concept of special expertise expresses con­
tents depending on space and time.
Tibor Adrd/y approaches the problem from the opposite pole. He ob­
serves that the "generally known" is a concept of changing contents, and 
the contents of that relative concept are not the same in our days as were 
in 1938; and in Hungary, it expresses something else than in any other 
country.^
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The law admits the significance of common knowiedge, commoniy 
known facts do not have to be proved. I t  is also an accepted principle that 
no special expertise is needed to establish or evaluate facts if general know­
ledge is sufficient to do so. Setting the lower limit of special expertise is 
important precisely for the very fact that it is to this limit that the proced- 
ding authorities may go in using their knowledge extending over the realm 
of law, beyond that an expert has to be employed. I t is easy to see that the 
correct setting of that limit is a step toward preventing the unnecessary 
use of experts. It is a different matter that the proceeding authorities quite 
often appoint experts to answer question which can be answered on the ba­
sis of ordinary, everyday experience.
My opinion is that the concept of .-.peciuZ experd'.se emAraces AnoM'Zedye 
no/ AeZonyiny /o /Ac proa wee o/ Aw MntZ yowy Aeyond /Ac Zúin'/.s o/ yeneraZ 
comwon /'KwZcdye.
But if the limits of expertise on the side of the authorities are examined 
in other words, if we want to know the limits beyond which the authorities 
are obliged to seek the assistance of an expert, the limits of the special ex­
pertise on the side of the expert also should be determined. I t is quite clear 
that the expert may use the whole of the knowledge belonging to the province 
of his own profession. The answer is not so simple when the question is 
whether the expert may or may not use his knowledge of other than his 
own speciality. In short, it is the matter of the eaper/'g cwnpc/ency.
I t would be difficult to dispute that due the nature of his tasks the 
expert obtains sometimes considerable skill and knowledge in fields not 
belonging to his own speciality. In fact, this is one of the factors that make 
an expert "experienced". Most probably, the medical expert can make good 
use of his knowledge of forensic ballistics when examining a bullet wound 
and the firearm expert also finds his knowledge in forensic medicine use­
ful, when the distance of the shot killing the victim has to be estimated. 
One could find a lot of similar examples. However, the availablity of such 
examples does not mean that the expert is entitled to give an opinion in 
questions not belonging to his own specific feield of expertise.
In the law evidence, great importance is attributed to the compe­
tency of the expert, the lack of his competency in practice equals to the 
uselessness of his opinion. Although the rules of the examination of compe­
tency may differ in the various systems, the aim is the same, namely to 
insure the expertise on the part of the person performing as an expert. As 
it has been pointed ou t: the expcit lacking competency is a pseudo-expert, 
and his opinion does not fit to prove the truth (Székely).
It is, of course, not an easy question to answer, what belongs to the 
competency of one type of expert and what to the other's. Thus, it is not 
without reason that Hungarian law makes it the obligation of the expert 
to inform the authority if answering a certain question does not belong to 
his competency. Other legal systems follow a different pattern. In common 
law systems the expert's qualifications are decisive, and if they are not ade­
quate, his opinion is not admissible.
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The problems of competency, in general, cannot be discussed here. 
There is, however, an issue related to it, which seems to evoke very strong 
feelings. The views and the stated opinions of the authors frequently are 
coloured by boiling emotions and in certain cases even the traces of logical 
reasoning cannot be discovered in the arguments. In the following parts I 
am going to attempt to discuss that problem, often described as the MSMe 
o/* 7a?c w Me errper? opón'ou.
IV.
In the literature of expert evidence, there are two major subtopics 
related to that main issue. The first one is, whether the expert should be 
allowed to express an opinion on an issue of law, and the second is the per­
missibility of the employment of the so-called eape/V q/ 7fw. From the two, 
it is the former that raises smaller problems. It is remarkable, though, that 
the authors express the same negative attit ude in both cases, although there 
is a difference between the two, which is worth keeping in mind.
aJ The authors share the view that the expert may not answer ques­
tions concerning issues of law in his opinion. János quoting Ifa/ra-
aor, takes the position that expressing an opinion on issues of law is not 
the task of the expert. According to Kálmán Fa&s, no expert's competency 
embraces the examination and evaluation of issues of law.9 Since there is 
no difference among the authors as far as the essence of the matter is con­
cerned, there is no need to describe other wiews. I t is, perhaps, not without 
foundation if one discoveres certain amount of professional jealousy in 
that uniformly negative attitude.
From an external viewpoint, legal knowledge is an expertise, and if it 
is prohibited for the lawyer to use directly his knowledge of other fields, 
he may rightly expect that his field of special expertise should not be in­
vaded by outsiders. According to everyday experience, many people believe 
that they "know the law" just because they are familiar with its certain 
elements, and it is not infrequent that judicial experts think the same way. 
Reaction to such opinions is not even jealousy in the original sense of the 
word, it is rather a justified protective feeling for one's own profession. 
As the worker of a clothing factory who has been sewing buttons on for a 
long time with enormous skill is far from being a tailor, a person with super­
ficial or everyday legal knowledge should not vindicate the right of expres­
sing an opinion on issues of law in court.
There is, however a much firmer basis for the mentioned negative a t­
titudes. And this is the simple fact that the authorities must not entrust 
the expert with deciding issues of law, since it would amount to transfer­
ring their functions. It is the proper authority and only the authority that 
should decide the issue of law and the expert 's role is limited to the process 
of proving facts. Any other kind of cast is unacceptable, for it would be sen­
seless (if the issue of law is decided by the expert, there is no need for the 
authority).
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It is a, different matter, that sometimes the expert misunderstands his 
roie and remi ts also on his position concerning the issue of law, in addition 
to his professional conclusions. This, of course is unacceptable as it is unac­
ceptable that the authorities should ask for his opinion on issues of law.
As far as the other problem — the employment of the expert of law 
— is concerned, the formulation of the arguments is much sharper and also 
much less convincing. János ¿MAely, for example, states firmly that no 
expert may be used in issues of law. As far as the existence and contents of 
the various legislations are concerned it is precisely the authority that has 
special expertise, and if there are doubts, the authority may make enquiries 
but may not employ an expert. quotes A'i.snMM, who also is against
the idea of the expert of law. ATsaMM, points out that the examination of the 
contents of the provisions of law is not a task for judicial experts and, as a 
decisive argument, he adds: the mandatory rules are written for broad 
lavers of people and are always understable for them.*"
Interestingly, <SzeMy simply declares that the employment of the ex­
pert of law is prohibited, while argumentation is not veiy con­
vincing. He explains the prohibition by saying that the provisions of law 
are always understable for those who are addressed by them. This state­
ment is not necessarily true in every case. Accepting, however, that those 
who are addressed by the provisions of law can always understand them, 
one still asks, whether the authorities can always understand those provi­
sions, too. I answer the question in the negative and in later parts I am go­
ing to explain why.
V.
One has to admit that the idea of employing an expert of law by the 
authorities proceeding in a criminal case is startling, if not shocking, from 
the traditional point of view. But if one tries to see the realities behind the 
presumed legal expertise of the proceeding authorities, he has to realize 
that many ofthose who participate in the administration justice as members 
of the authorities, have only an imcomplete knowledge of law and are fa­
miliar only with certain segments of it. The simplest way to put it is to 
make a distinction between those who have a law degree and those who 
do not. The latters do not posses any special expertise in the field of law, 
their knowledge in that province — similarly to other areas — is less than 
professional. Thus, it is illusory to speak of the legal expertise of the autho­
rity in the sense that every member of it posseses that expertise. I t  is more 
realistic to say that the authority has the necessary legal expertise, because 
it has members with the required special knowledge in law. In that sense 
even the investigating authoritiy has legal expertise, although the propor­
tion of members without legal education is the highest there, among the 
authorities participating in the administration of justice. All this perhaps 
may render the idea of employing external legal expert by the authorities 
less shocking.
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According to the traditional attitude, the expert of Jaw is alien to the 
administration of justice. In Hungarian Jega! writings for exampJe. the 
authors even in recent times treated the wmuY c?ní'n" principie as an 
axiom. This is why the idea of the expert of Jaw was rejected by many aut­
hors witJiout any expJanation, which creates! the impression that the idea is 
siJJy or the invention of the deviJ. It is advisable, however, to examine from 
time to time the validity and correctness of the axioms we use, since the 
changes of the circumstances may render certain axioms obsoJate. As far 
as the yMr% nonY cMrñz principie is concerned, if we are to examine its pre­
sent vaJue we have to set out from its origina! meaning.
As to the interpretation of the principie the first thins to note is that 
in its origina) sense it expressed the presumption of the court's knowledge 
of iaw. The persumption did not extend to other authorities participating 
in the administration of justice.
There has never been a principie to support the presumed legal ex­
pertise of the other authorities. We do not know a principie saying that the 
pubiic prosecutor or the investigator knows the iaw ex octeto. Neither is 
there any ruie or presumption saying that an attorney, who places his iegai 
expertise at the disposal of others as his profession, knows the iaw.
All this is evidently in connection with that in the administration of 
justice fina! decision in the cases beiongs, in generai, to the court and the 
persumption supports the faith that the decision of the administer of justice 
is correct. It is probable that the principie in fact is not a persumption, rat­
her it is a rule" which is to heip the activity of the court and to exciude that 
the parties could dispute its iegai expertise (i.e. that court is familiar with 
al! the relevant provisions of law). At the same time the law recognizes the 
possibility of the incorrect application of the relevant provisions and pro­
vides for a remedy by allowing appeal in issues of law.
It seems, however, that the original function of the rule is disregarded 
today and many jurists take the /Mm nord cMrfn principle at its face-value 
without ever trying to see. whether it is a true or a false proposition. In 
my opinion, such an examination would not be a wasted effort. If the prin­
ciple is not more than a rule aimed at assisting the operation of the court, 
the only question to be answered is whether we need it. If the principle is 
supposed to express the truth we have to sec, whether it is 
really true, or not. If the principle is true, the dispute is pointless, but if 
it is not, a decision has to be made: Should we insist on maintaining it or 
should we find some more realistic means to ensure that the court's lack of 
knowledge of law could not be a basis for an attack on its judgement. Be­
fore going on, in order to avoid misunderstanding, I have to make a short 
remark.
I do not wish to identify legal expertise, or legal knowledge, with the 
knowledge of the positive law. Hut in this discussion, when legal expertise 
or the knowledge of law is mentioned I refer to the knowledge of positive 
law. I t  is only natural that the correctness or validity of the pirn, noiu'f 
CM/in principle is examined from such a perspective, in accordance with its 
original meaning.
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The principle at the time of its formulation was in complete harmony 
with the prevailing views in Hungary on the essence of criminal procedure. 
When the procedure is considered in theory as consisting of the preparatory 
and the trial phase, somewhat less significance is attributed to the activi­
ties of the investigat ing aut hority and of the prosecutor beiorc presenting 
the accusation to the court, i.e. to the preparatory phase. Consequently! 
the legal expertise of these authorities does not have to be buttressed.
There is however, a theory accepted in a number of countries, including 
Hungary, according to which criminal procedure should be considered as a 
homogeneous unity, in spite of the existence of naturally distinguishable 
phases. The effects of the theory are well reflected also by the literature on 
expert evidence. In Hungarian legal writings, for example, the authors, 
sometimes without referring expressly to the underlying theory, mention 
"the authorities" when discussing special expertise or the appointment of 
experts, and not only the court. It is logical: in the homogeneous procedure 
the authorities have to be treated equally, although their functions are 
different. As far as t he know ledge of law is concerned, it is beyond doubt 
that all the authorities of criminal procedure need it. After all, the investi­
gating authoritiy decides issues of law when starts or terminates an inves­
tigation. the prosecutor also uses legal expertise when makes the decision 
to prosecute, etc. And it would be difficult to deny that these authorities 
display certain activities having the character of the administration of jus­
tice in a sense: they terminate cases with finality. In Hungary, for example, 
about half of the started criminal proceedings come to an end before the 
trial phase. So, if we wanted to amend the no ¡at mrua principle so that 
it would express the realities and theories of the present, we should say 
"the authority knows the law ex officio", and not only the court. However, 
it is not certain that such a statement is born out by facts — as pointed 
out in above parts. Hut it is perhaps unnecessary to buttress the the legal 
expertise of the authorities by a presumption, neither the reinforcement or 
incrcase of the prestige of the authorities nor other considerations require 
that. The extension of the scope of the principle, thus, is not really ne­
cessary.
Hut let us examine now whether the principle in its original sense is 
valid or not in our days. Thus the question is, whether it is true that the 
court knows the law, or not.
1 know w ell that such a formulation of a question provides good chan­
ces for misuderstanding or misinterpretation. So, before anyone could con­
clude the opposite from the question, I hurry to say that I do not intend 
to accuse the court with the lack of legal expertise. Hut. I have also to say, 
that I, for one, answer the question in the negative. 1 trust I shall be able 
to show there is no real contradiction between the tw o statements.
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VI.
I t seems that the increasing number of iegisiations is a growing con­
cern for the lawyers of many countries. Indeed, the body of legal norms is 
getting more and more vast and difficult to survey. The authors complain 
about the quantity of new laws and other legislations, and the figures are 
really surprising. According to certain estimations the increase in the body 
of norms in force between 1968 and 1980 in Hungary was 25 per cent.^ 
The number of legislations in force was more than 5000 in 1984, according 
to the Hungarian Ministry of Justice. All these figures, however, show only 
the top of the iceberg, since certain lower level sources of law are not in­
cluded.
No doubt, the majority of those norms never play any role in crimi­
nal cases. But even the fragments represent a quantity of norms too big 
to expect the judges to have a comprehensive knowledge of them. One 
might even say that the knowledge of the mere existence of certain norms 
cannot be a reasonable expectation either. All this, however, is not more 
than a difficulty, which can be eliminated. Even if the knowledge of all the 
norms of law in force cannot be a realistic expectation, it is reasonable to 
expect that the judge should be able to look for and find the relevant norms. 
It is a question only of a good computerized system, which does not present 
more than practical problems.
Practical problems alone hardly could justify the rejection of theyara 
H-ortY cMrfa principle as a requirement but they cast serious doubts on its 
truth. From here the next step is to conclude, that at present, the courts 
could solve the problems originating from the pullulation of legislations 
by making use of the expertise of the specialists working in the relevant 
fields. The question is w hat the ways of employing the specialists are. i.e. 
what solutions of procedural law should be found in order to overcome the 
legal and theoretical obstacles.
There is another problem related to the issues of legal "overregulation'' 
and it concerns the contents of the legal norms. A significant part of the 
norms regulates or is related to matters of technology or production, etc., 
the deeper understanding of which requires a knowledge extending well 
beyond the limits of the knowledge possessed by the average jurist. To un­
derstand these norms one needs to know the field the norm is supposed to 
regulate. When the court proceeds in a criminal case and such a norm is 
relevant for the correct decision, its contents sometimes cannot be disco­
vered by using the regular methods of interpreting the law. There might 
even be instances when simple grammatical interpretation is impossible, 
since these norms use, of course, the professional terms, the terminology of 
the field concerned, and to understand them one needs considerable know­
ledge of that field.
Such legislations are first of all certain regulations of industrial se­
curity measures, technological regulations etc., which are important enough 
to require the form of a statute. Such legislations are frequent in heavy 
industry, chemical industry, transport, mining, etc. Considering the nature
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of the matters regulated in them, i.e. the fact that the professional conside­
rations of the field in question are the dominant in them and these elements 
take only the form of a statute, these norms can be considered as "quasi 
statutes" or "legal norms", at most. It would be easy to conclude that the 
quasi statutes actually do not belong to the body of law, at least not in the 
sense that the courts should know them, which would be equal to saying 
that theyiMW, cvrm principle is still valid. As a consequence, any further 
debate would be needless: dealing with quasi statutes is not dealing with 
law and what is not an issue of law can be dealt with by an expert accor­
ding even to the most conservative view.
I fear, this radical solution is not the perfect one, since it leaves the 
question unanswered, which one is a quasi statute an which is a "real" 
one. And it can be added, if quasi and real statutes are clearly distinguished, 
one cannot be sure that the body of real law is not too vast to expect the 
court to know it.
Although the facts about the number and nature of the legislations 
are well-known, the idea that the court might not know the "law" (even in 
the limited sense of positive law) seems sacrilegeous: the illusion that the 
judge possesses a complete knowledge of law is not fading. In Hungarian 
legal writings almost every author repeatcs the statement: the court knows 
the law. However, the the voiced idea cannot convince me just because it is 
repeated many times and it does not convince others either. Janos 
for example, who is clearly an adherent of the ywra non/ cnriu principle, 
is not convinced himself about the truth of it, since after declaring that the 
court knows the law he immediately adds: if it is not so, the court has to 
make enquiries, but an expert of law may not be used. It means that Ax?- 
M y himself does not believe the court knows the law but he accepts the 
principle as a means to put the legal expertise of the court beyond doubt. 
Only that can be an expalantion of the fact that in his opinion an informal 
enquiry is allowed but the appointment of an expert (i.e. seeking evidence) 
is not.
In my opinion, the expert of law is notsuch a devil with hoofs and tail as 
seen by certain authors, nor is he a super "jurist" f&cM yJ replacing the 
judge. In my opinion, /Ae carper/ of Aw-, would not decide in matters of law. 
hut iroidd ync ctidewcc of /Ac earM/ence o/ cer/atM. ¿/o/M/e.s or /eyM/o/i'oM.s and 
M?OM?d earplom /7;w con/en/y. Proving the existence and contents of certain 
provisions of law is not passing decision on a legal matter regulated by 
that particular piece of legislation.
I fully agree with all those who object to the idea that the expert should 
decide any legal issue or even declare his opinion of such matters, either 
on his own iniciative or on the request of the proceeding authority. But I 
do not see any violation of the courts competency, if the expert reports on 
the existence of a certain legislation. Similarly, there is nothing wrong, in 
my opinion, with the expert's explaining the actual contents of certain 
norms, obscure for the jurist because of the use of the terms of the profes­
sion they arc related to. What must not be allowed is the subsumption of 
the facts known by expert under the norm of law. It is always the procee-
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ding authority, and the court, in particular, that has to decide, whether 
the facts of the case represent a violation of a norm of law or not, even if 
the contents of the norm were obscure for the authority without the ex­
pert's explanations.
In oder to avoid misunderstanding, I have to emphasize, the traditio­
nal views of the adherents of the ?;.or ¿Y cM/á/ principle are perfectly ra­
tional. The acceptance of the principle is one of the possible answers to the 
question asked earlier in this paper (i.e.: Does the court know the law or 
not?). The principle tells everyone that the court's knowledge of law has 
to be admitted and serves as an irrebuttable presumption.
I t is not infrequent in law that presumptions or even fictions are used 
to solve certain problems or to prevent the occurence of problems, and the
non! caria principle fits well among them, even if the court's full know­
ledge of law is not a proposition easy to defend, in addition, the potential 
knowledge of law on the part of the court has to be admitted, i.e. the autho­
rities, including the court, posses the ability to know the law, the authorities 
have the professional knowledge and other facilities necessary to obtain the 
actual knowledge of positive law that is needed to pass judgement in the 
particular case in question.
From the jMra cwM principle it logically follows that the pro­
ceeding authority, including again the court, if not familiar with the rele­
vant provisions of positive law, has to obtain the needed actual knowledge 
through informal enquiry, research, consultation or perhaps expert advice. 
And, of course, this is equal to giving up the advantages of a contradictoria! 
trial.
On the other hand, the acceptance of the expert of law logically fol­
lows from the unacceptance of the principle. And, considering the facts 
related to the contents and quantity of legislations which clearly prove 
that the propostion expressed by the principle is not really true, one has 
to think twice before answering the question whether it is worth conside­
ring and maintaining the principle as valid and denying the very idea of 
the expert of law (rather in order to protect the myth of the court's full 
legal knowledge than on the basis of reality).
Although 1 have to admit that 1 am for the expert of law, I am aware 
my suggestions are not without dangers either. The first cause of concern is 
that the acceptence of the necessity of the expert of law leads to an uncer­
ta in ly  in connection of the concept of positive law. One has to admit, the 
distinction between "quasi law" and law in general sense (the latter belon­
ging to the necessary minimum knowledge of the authority) may make the 
concept of law somewhat looser. But it is the consequence of reality, the 
uncertainity of the concept is due to the facts of legislation.
It might prove to be very difficult to draw the line between quasi 
legal norms, not necessarily known by the court, and norms the knowledge 
of which could reasonably be expected of the trained jurist. Clearly, the 
criteria have to be worked out by theory, the matter may not be left to 
the court proceeding in a case. Without carefully and reasonably determi­
ned criteria only judicial ignorance would be given justification.^
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I t  also has to be admitted, that the employment of the expert of iaw 
may add to the confusion concerning the distinction between issue of fact 
and issue of iaw. Most probabiy, there are other reasons of concern that 
couid be mentioned. Hut 1 beiieve firmiy that the acceptance of the expert 
of iaw has far more advantages than disadvantages.
The expert, proving the existence and contents of certain norms of 
iaw would display his activities according to the rules concerning expert 
evidence. The public nature of his activity, i.e. that the parties would have 
direct acces to what the expert says and they could check it themselves, is a 
much more favourable solution from the point of view of guarantees than 
the informal enquiry on the part of the court. In short, the advantages of 
the acceptance of the possibility of employing an expert of law can be 
found in making use of the means of contradictorial trial. And since no 
more efficient model of the establishment of truth in ciiminal cases has been 
invented up to now, these advantages may not be called inconsiderable.
VII.
According to the generally accepted ideas, the essantial element of the 
expert evidence is the opinion of the expert. — Discussing the expert of 
law, it was showing the existence and explaining the contents of certain 
norms that I mentioned as the essence of his role. Resorting to some gram­
matical or linguistic interpretation it would be easy to conclude that the 
expert of law does not provide an expert opinion since showing the existen­
ce or the explanation of certain norms is not an opinion. And, as it is also 
generally accepted that it is the opinion of the expert that is evidence in 
criminal procedure, the expert of law would provide only information and 
not evidence. Thus, the debate about the acceptability of the expert of 
law is empty, it is useless speculation about a nonexistent problem. How­
ever, in my opinion, the expert of law would be a participant of the evi­
dentiary process, although he vould only report the existence or the con­
tents of a certain norm of Jaw. Here a contradiction may be discovered, 
the dissolution of which seems desirable, even if it is not a real contradic­
tion.
First of all we have to see, it is not obtaining the expert's opinion that 
is the single aim and justification of employing an expert in criminal pro­
cedure, although, in the majority of cases it is the apparent reason of his 
appointment.
As it has been mentioned in other parts of this paper, the expert pro­
vides special knowledge for the purposes of the procedure. His report, how­
ever, is usually more than reporting professional knowledge and usually 
(but not always) the active use of professional knowledge is needed to pro­
duce the report .
Janos who interpretes professional expertise as the knowledge
of certain principles of experience, writes: the expert provides his expertise 
for the authority, he provides principles of experience (including scientific 
principles). He knows, for example, what is the combustion temperature of
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certain materials, what are the ways to show the presence of a certain mat­
ter, etc. In this sense, the principles of experience are principles of science 
or technology or techniques that could be found in books, or principles re­
cognized by the expert in the course of his practical activities. Reporting 
such a principle is not a task for an expert in <S'2¿A'e/y'.s opinion, "because 
the opinion element is not present in it". According to him. the second task 
of the expert in connection with the use of the principles of experience is to 
apply them to known facts and to draw a conclusion, while the third type 
of these tasks is to percieve facts and to apply the principles of experience 
to them".
The distiction of the two latter tasks is rather uncertain, and perhaps 
it is not needed.
The activity requiring special expertise in practice can be of two kinds. 
The expert !. provides certain professional information (even principles 
of experience) without any examination of any material or facts, simply on 
the basis of his knowledge and 2. uses his expertise to establish or evaluate 
certain facts. The second is more than providing information, the additio­
nal element is the professional opinion of the expert , and this is the specific 
element in expert evidence. For this reason it is true, that providing an opi­
nion is the most characteristic task of the expert.
However, in my opinion, the task mentioned in item 1. may also be a 
task for the expert, even if it is not the most typical one in practice. I t is 
certain that its precondition is professional knowledge on the part of the 
expert. I t is not difficult to see that in certain cases the court and the par­
ties need precisely this type of expert report in the evidentiary process. It is 
not inconcievable that someone refers to a certain scientific fact or prin­
ciple used by certain professionals and someone else disputes its correctness 
or simply does not know about it. The expert's statement of the existence 
or the contents of the principle might be quite enough to decide the dispute 
between the interested parties. And, although it is possible, no doubt, to 
find the necessary information in professional books or to find it out from 
an advisor in an informal way, it is precisely the evidentiary value of the 
expert evidence that will be lost in such a process. In turn, if an expert is 
ap]X)inted to provide the required information, his statement can be used 
as evidence if the appropriate evidentiary rules are followed.
Thus, it seems, Me yeweta/Z?/ accep/cd news concerning the most impor­
tant characteristic features of the expert evidence /atre /o & reused; Me 
eapet/'s repor/ //my serre rts endente eren ?///te opt'ntott e/etnett/ ts no/ preset?/ t'tt 
t/. But if it is so, then there is no reason to say that the expert of law is not 
fit to prove the existence and contents of certain norms of law.
True, a report containing such information would not have any opi­
nion element but the lack of that does not exclude the use of the expert's 
report in the evidentiary process.
The condition of producing expert evidence is that the report should 
be that of an expert and it should include facts the authority does not know 
because they belong to a field beyond the authority's province of knowled­
ge. So, the mentioned contradiction can be dissolved by revising the con-
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cepts concerning the essence of expert evidence. I doubt, however, that 
many scholars would be willing to proceed with such a revision just to 
make the idea of the expert of law less unfit ior good society.
I suspect, perhaps with reason, the negative attitude toward the ex­
pert of law is due partly to the unfortunate connotations of the name. If 
the name not suggested that the court might need expert assistance even 
within its own field, or if it did not remind us of the dangers of tansferring 
decision on issues of law to the expert, scholarly resistance might not be 
so strong. Luckily, practising jurists are realists: judges ask the reporting 
expert without particular hesitation also about the relevant norms regula­
ting the details for skeleton laws. And most probably, no judge would be 
ashamed to admit that he did not read every published legislation. ^
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ЭКСПЕРТЫ В УГОЛОВНОМ ПРОЦЕССЕ И МИФ ТЕЗИСА 
„ЮРА НОВИТ КУРИА"
(Резюме)
Без применения экспертов современный уголовный процесс нельзя пред­
ставить. Употребление права часто требует применения знания не юридического 
характера которое часто превышает круг административных знаний.
Автор в его трактате занимается толькованием понятия «специального панн- 
мания дела« которое является осиовнымо источником экспертиза. Исследуя пределы 
знания эксперта и администрации устонапливает, что принципы состязательного 
процесса не допускают администрации прямо использовать возможные знания 
относящиеся к области эксперта и чтобы она не обращала внимания на экспертиз. 
Занимает позицию в связи сте.м, что и эксперт не может высказаться в вопросах 
права. Зато не считает высказыванием мнения если эксперт информирует администра­
цию о существовании таких уставов технического характера знание которого не 
требуется у администрации из-за большого количества ктаих норм.
Исследуя традиционный тезис «юра новит куриа« в настоящий момент он 
считаетего несостоятельным. Осуждая взгляды профессиональной литературы он 
занимает позицию в связи с признанием так называемого юридического эксперта.




Das moderne Strafverfahren ist ohne die Anwendung Sachverständiger unvorstellbar. 
Die Rechtsanwendung erfordert oft ein den Kreis der behördlichen Kenntnisse übersteigen­
des Wissen nicht rechtlicher Natur. Der Autor beschäftigt sich in seiner Studie mit der In­
terpretation des Begriffes des "besonderen Sachverständnisses", welches die grundlegende 
Quelle des Sachverständigengutachtens darstellt. Unter Untersuchung der Grenzen des 
Kenntnisbereiches der Behörden bzw. des Sachverständigen stellt er fest, daß es die Prinzi­
pien des kontradiktorischen Verfahrens nicht erlauben, daß die Behörde ihre zum Sach­
verständigengebiet gehörenden eventuellen Kenntnisse unmittelbar verwendet und von der 
Einholung des Sachverständigengutachtens absieht. Er ist der Ansicht , daß auch der Sach­
verständige nicht Stellung zu rechtlichen Fragen nehmen kann. Er betrachtet es allerdings 
nicht als Stellungsnahme, wenn der Sachverständige die Behörde vom Vorhandensein sol­
cher Vorschriften technischer Natur in Rechtsregelform informiert, deren Kenntnis unter 
Hinsicht auf die große Zahl solcher Normen von der Behörde verstandesgemäß nicht erwartet 
werden kann. Die traditionelle These jurn nord enrt'« untersuchend stellt er fest, daß diese 
gegenwärtig nicht mehr zu halten ist. Unter Kritik der Ansichten in der Fachliteratur nimmt 
er für die Anerkennung der die Existenz und den Inhalt solcher Rechtsregeln mitteilenden 
sog. juristischen Sachverständigen Stellung.
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